College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Colonial Lawyer

Law School Journals

1976

Colonial Lawyer, Vol. 6, No.1 (Spring 1976)
Editors of Colonial Lawyer

Repository Citation
Editors of Colonial Lawyer, "Colonial Lawyer, Vol. 6, No.1 (Spring 1976)" (1976). Colonial Lawyer. 15.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmcl/15

Copyright c 1976 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmcl

THE COLONIAL LAWYER
VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1

CONTENTS

SPRING,1976
Edltor-In-Chle'
Terry N. Grinnalds
1. Editorials

Editorial Board
William M. Batts. III
John L. Carver
Rhetta M. Daniel
John C. Morehead
Victor Neubaum. Jr.
Stephen P. Ormond
Janet Rubin
Judith Wall

eon""'utlnfl Org,."lzetlons
Black American Law Students Assoc.
The Environmental Law Group
The International Law Society
The Mary and William Society

The Colonial Lawyer is published at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of
William and Mary. The opinions expressed are

3. An Interim Assessment of the
1972 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments
-Denis J. Brion
7. Stare Decisis
-Jane Bedno
8. The Duty to Rescue
-Ingrid Hillinger
9. Positive Eugenics and the Law
-Mark Horoschak
18. The Morality of Suicide
-R. Gregory Barton
23. Semi-Student Bargaining
-Kathleen Nixon
28. Thermal Efficiency Standards
For BUildings
-John L. Carver

those of the writers and do not necessarily
reflect the pOSition of the school.

EDITORIALS
AN INTRODUCTION
Welcome to The Colonial Lawyer. For those readers
meeting it for the first time, perhaps a note of introduction is in order. First as a newspaper, and since 1969 as
a magazine, the Lawyer has served Marshall-Wythe as a
forum for student thought on the law school and the
law. For the past year the Lawyer has been, as it were,
"on vacation." Now it is back.
Diversity is the objective of the Lawyer, and the contents of this issue exemplify that goal. Two articles follow
an environmental vein. The first, a guest article by Mr.
Denis Brion, traces the development of the 1972 Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Mr. Brion,
who this year joined the faculty of Marshall-Wythe, is the
present president of the Virginia State Water Control
Board, a body that has been unusually visible to the
public eye this year because of its responsibility to
investigate first the Kepone scandal and later the Great
Chesapeake Bay Oil spill.

Also on the environmental side, John L Carver, the
Secretary-Treasurer of The Environmental Law Group at
Marshall-Wythe and the editor-in-chief of that organization's publication The Environmental Practice News,
examines the possibility of "Thermal Efficiency Standards For Buildings."
Three articles in this issue have in common a concern
for the problems that arise when law attempts to deal
with morality. Ingrid Hillinger considers the problems of
"The Duty to Rescue," while R. Gregory Barton takes a
fresh look at "The Morality of Suicide." Mark Horoschak, in his turn, contributes a study on "Positive
Eugenics and the Law."
On a practical note, Kathleen Nixon's article: "SemiStudent Bargaining" delves into the timely issue of the
rights of graduate teaching assistants and medical interns and residents to bargain collectively for higher pay.
Finally, on the lighter side. Jane Bedno finds poetry
in the justice that defines women's "place" under the
law.
We think you will find it interesting.
CHANGES
With this issue, The Colonial Lawyer begins a new
chapter in its history. While outwardly little changed
from past issues, internally the Lawyer has undergone a
1

revolution in concept. Those of us most intimately concerned with the change view it with mixed emotions. We
believe that it may be a great step forward for the
publication. but our hopes are tempered by the knowledge that no such drastic reorganization should ever
have been necessary.
There is an ennui in this school that sometimes threatens even the most viable organizations. Time and again
those students attempting to organize some ambitious
project for the benefit of the school at large find themselves hamstrung by the lack of support from their
fellows. Be the effort a one-time speaker presentation or
a continuing project such as the Lswyer. it is crippled by
this disinterest.
In 1975 a staffing crisis nearly terminated The Colonisl
Lswyer. In an effort to save it. members of four special
interest groups: The Environmental Law Group The Black
American Law Students Association (BALSA). The Mary
and William Society and The International Law Society
joined to serve as the Lswyer's staff. Consequently. this
magazine is now operated under an agreement that
allows these groups to use it as their voice and as a
vehicle for articles concerning their particular spheres of
interest.
This is not to say that The Colonisl Lswyer does not
remain a basically independent publication. Essentially
there is now a quid pro quo arrangement whereby these
groups will provide active support for the Lswyer in
return for an opportunity to express their views through
it. Otherwise the magazine's content is determined by its
editor and staff who may not necessarily be affiliated
with any of these groups.
We feel that. through service as a voice of these
interest groups at Marshall-Wythe. The Colonisl Lswyer
is embarking upon a new path of service. Nevertheless.
we cannot but be saddened by the knowledge that it was
not a voluntary decision that led to this move. but rather
an effort of desperation to save the Lswyer from dying of
indifference.
The virtue of a magazine like the Lswyer is that it
serves as a forum for· many diverse themes and forms of
expression. Neither day-to-day topicality nor stringent
technicality need restrict its format. For the reader.
perhaps more than any other law school publicati.Jn a
magazine serves as a window into the thoughts of his
fellow students. We of The Coloniel lswyer staff hope
that our publicaton's "vacations" are over and that. in
the future. the student body of Marshall-Wythe will
support it and wield it as a valuable tool of expression.
-Terry N. Grinnalds
THE DEMISE UI" ACTIVISM:
BAD NEWS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
Unheralded. unannounced. and without warning.
events have transpired which bode ill for the future of the
campaign for 8 quality environment for America. Subtle
subjective indicators lead to the conclusion that the
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environmental movement is in danger of foundering.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that environmental enthusiasm has abated. In the early days of the
"new environmental awareness." groups proliferated. It
was "in" and fashionable to talk about the environment.
People who did not know what "environment" meant
flocked to the "Earth Day" demonstrations. Thera was
an environmental franzy which promised not only new
legislation. but also attitudinal changes among the public
at large. During this period. the concern with the quality
of life seemed to blossom. and the environmental
movement had basically a positive image.
Today. however.-it is not "in" tei be-environmentally
active. The zealous emotionalism of earlier days (which
may have led to some abuses by conservationists) has
been supplanted by "ho hum" establishment procedures
for the protection of the environment. Today those not
working through establishment channels are suspect
and. by-in-Iarge. are cast in a negative light. The
remaining activists are considered radical rabblerousers
who lie in wait to oppose any or everything.
The large industrial polluters. who were the villains in
the early days of the environmental crusade. have successfully changed their images. Currently in all forms of
media. we see 8 succession of advertisements which
remind the American public what Exxon. General Motors. or some other corporate giant is doing to protect the
environment. Power companies. oil companies and
others have successfully portrayed environmental activists as being anti-affluence. anti-American (the American athic is basad on growth). and anti-progress. The
miseries of the recant recession are even portrayed as
evidence of the danger of environmental negativism I
This coup by industrial. expansionist. "anti-anvironmental" forces is now driving activism to near extinction.
What remains after activism has lost its popularity are
those of us who continue to fight the long tedious lagal
battles against almost insurmountable odds. The corporate forces now command legions of highly paid and
experienced environmental (or anti-environmental7) attorneys. These same corporate forces support a huge.
well-financed lobby and public relations campaign.
Through such efforts. the "anti-environmentalists" have
either neutralized public opinion or have swung it to their
side. At best today one can hope that the public is only
apathetic.
In the face of all this Madison Avenue profeSSionalism.
the uncoordinated. ill-financed forces of the environmentalists have little spirit or morale left. Activism is
dying. and the environmental movement is foundering
Activism must not die. Those who in these times doggedly wage unpopular battles recognize that. while
activism has its excesses and is sometimes even
counter-productive. its spark is what keeps the environmental movement vital.
-John L. Carver

AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF
THE
1972 FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS
Denis J. Brion

It is becoming a part of the conventional wisdom that
the national legislative process has undergone substantial degeneration-under the typical pattern, Congress
creates, with considerable fanfare, an ambitious federal
program in order to cure one or another of the social ills
which plague our times. Next comes a ritual bill-signing
ceremony during which the President intones that this
particular program is the most significant of our generation. There then follows a period during which, again
with the attention of the news media, prominent individuals are appointed to the top positions in the new
bureaucracy. This phase is inevitably followed by the
setting in of a long period of bureaucratic routine, under
which the program continues because of its momentum,
with expanding funding but with no real impact on the
problem for which the program was created. To the
average citizen, the whole process seems to be one of
cumulation-new programs are constantly being created, old programs continue, no program seems to solve
anything, and the burden of government seems ever to
increase. It has reached the point that the traditional
conservative battle cry against big government is now
being echoed in the opposing camps. Edmund Muskie,
for instance, is now wondering whether the largeness of
government is hampering the ability of government to do
its job. And Edmund Brown, Jr., is past the stage of
wondering; he is actively advocating a reduction in the
size of government.
The purpose of this article is not to examine the nature
of this trend, nor is it to comment on the efficiency of the
political process. Rather it is to assess, however briefly
within the context of this new conventional wisdom, the
nature of one ambitious federal program, its impact
nationwide as well as in Virginia, and some of its
prospects.

A. A Brief Description of the '972 Amendments
In October, 1972, Congress enacted the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,. a comprehensive rewriting and expansion of an existing federal
pollution abatement statue. These amendments, commonly referred to by their Public Law number, Pl
92-500, set ultimate goels for achieving the cleanup'of
America's watercourses. By July 1, 1977, industrial
discharges must be treated by treatment works using
"the best practicable control technology currently
available," and municipal sewage treatment works must
be capable of "secondary treatment." By July 1, 1983,
industrial waste treatment works must be capable of "the
best available technology economically achievable," and
municipal sewage treatment works must achieve "the
best practicable waste treatment technology."
What all this euphonious language is intended to mean
is that, by July 1, 1983, "an interim goel of water
quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for
recreation in and on the water" is to be achieved; and, by
1985, "the national goel that the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters be eliminated" is to be
achieved. In brief, these goels represent a truly ambitious
commitment to reversing the generations-long process of
the degredation of the waterways of America-an enterprise worthy in comparison to the most grandiose
government programs that have been initiated in the two
centuries of our republic.
The mechanisms of Pl 92-500 are as complex as the
intent is massive. The heart of the enactment is the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES), which sets up a regulatory mechanism based
on the concept of federal-state cooperation. Under
NPDES, all persons who potentially might discharge
pollutants must obtain a discharge permit; "persons"
includes both private entities, such as industries, and
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public entities, such as municipalities. The NPDES permits are issued under direct regulatory programs established and carried out by the individual states. However,
these individual programs are approved in advance by
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
the substantive content of the programs is controlled by
regulations promulgated by EPA. The authority of EPA to
issue these various regulations and guidelines creates for
that agency a role of setting standards, in which it
establishes tolerable levels of various kinds of pollutants,
treatment standards, levels of quality for. receiving
waters, and procedural requirements. And, because EPA
must approve the individual state programs and is empowered to withdraw this approval, EPA also fills the role
of overseer.
Other hardly less important provisions of Pl 92-500
provide for a comprehensive scheme of state planning
carried out under federal guidelines and assisted by
federal grant funds; for substantial research and
development to be conducted by EPA in waste treatment
technology; and for a broad enforcement scheme. The
complex scheme of planning includes river basin plans,
which are to describe present water quality conditions
and to project future conditions and treatment requirements; management plans, which are to establish the
means by which these treatment requirements are to be
met; and a more sophisticated level of planning for the
purpose of defining and establishing means to abate less
obvious but no less important forms of pollution such as
storm water rllnoft from urban areas, siltation from land
areas disturbed by development, and runoff of nutrient-laden waters from heavily-fertilized agricultural
lands. The enforcement scheme of Pl 92-500 is carried
out primarily by the individual states, but the EPA has
broad residual authority to step into any faltering state
process; and a relatively generous citizen suit provision is
also included.
If the heart of Pl 92-500 is NPDES, the prime mover
is the federal fund grantmg process under which EPA
provides 75% of the costs of public sewage treatment
works. Pl 92-500 authorized a total of $18 billion for
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such purposes, spread over fiscal years 1972, 1973,
and 1974; and despite a delay because of a presidential
impoundment of a large' portion of the funds (which
impoundment was struck down by the courts), the money has been made available and will soon be substantially spent.
These funds are parceled out in a complicated
procedure under which the individual states are required
to adopt a rating system for assessing priorities of
potential fund recipients, followed by a three-stage
process under which the various projects, once selected
far funding, are moved from inception through the
design phase to completion.
Finally, Pl 92-500 established a "National Study
Commission," charged with the duty to
make a full and complete investigation and study of all of
the technological aspects of echieving. and all aspects of
the total economic. social. and environmental effects of
achieving or not achieving. the effluent limitations and
goals set forth for 1983 in. . . this Act.

Thus, the National Study Commission was charged with
the duty to make its report by September, 1975, in order
to permit "mid-<:ourse corrections." Pl 92-500 carries
with it no irrebuttable presumption that it is the end-all;
rather, a mechanism is instead established to compare
goals with performance and to reassess the wisdom of
continued pursuit of those goals.
This somewhat long summary of Pl92-500 is actually
only a simplified overview-the print of the Act covers
eighty-nine prolix pages, and it is one of the most
complex pieces of legislation ever to come out of Congress at one time.
B. The Interim Report of the
National Study Commission
The obvious question,of course, is whether such a
monstrosity can really work. The staft report of the
National Study Commission was issued in November,
1975, and the recommendations of the Commission
became available in March, 1976. The findings of the
Commission are interesting. On a nationwide basis, the

commission found that publicly owned sewage treatment
works will not meet the July 1, 1977, deadline for
secondary treatment, primarily because not enough
federal grant funds have been made available. The
Commission estimates that an additional eleven years
and $118.5 billion in 75% federal grants will be
required. Similarly, the July 1, 1977, goal for industrial
discharges will not be met, but the industries are expected to meet this goal much sooner-by 1980-than
the 1988 completion date for public treatment works.
Moreover, the report concludes that there has already
been noticeable improvement, generally, in water quality
conditions.
C. Progress in Virginia under PL 92-500
In Virginia, for a variety of reasons, the institutional
ingredients have long existed for taking advantage of the
initiatives available under PL 92-500. In 1946, more
than a generation ago, Virginia established one of the
first water pollution regulatory agencies, for the ironic
purpose of attracting more industry to the Commonwealth. With a relatively vigorous response to PL
92-500, Virginia has been able to obtain a total of $496
million of the authorized grant funds for municipal
treatment facility construction:
$ 58 million
Fiscal Year 1973
Fiscal Year 1974
$ 88 million
Fiscal Year 1975
$ 99 million
Fiscal Year 1976
$251 million
Since the federal grant pays for 75% of project cost, the
total project value initiated in Virginia under PL 92-500
is $661 million, a not insubstantial public works investment by any measure, and a prodigious undertaking for
an environmental endeavor. Nor is this the only impressive feature that can be offered. In terms of physical
facilities in place, these funds will represent the initial
construction or improvement of municipal treatment
works with a combined total capacity of approximately
390 million gallons per day (MGD). Stated differently,
using a rule of thumb of 90 gallons of sewage per day
generated per capita and a total Virginia populaton of
about 5 million, these funds have a direct impact on the
waste of 89% of Virginia's populaton. This figure is even
more substantial when it is considered that a certain
portion of the population is too dispersed to be served by
centralized facilities.
The types of facilities being provided under these
projects cover a broad spectrum of treatment techniques
and treatment capacity. They range from a simple central
septic system for the tiny Roanoke Valley community of
Boones Mill to advanced, most-sophisticated-in-thecountry tertiary treatment plants at Roanoke, Charlottesville, Winchester, Waynesboro, Alexandria, Arlington,
eastern Fairfax County, and Prince William County. The
largest of these tertiary plants will have a capacity of 54 .
MGD and the combined total capacity of 214 MGD, a
capability to serve 48% of the population of the commonwealth. In addition, several antiquated treatment
plants in the Hampton Roads area are being substantially
upgraded, three newer plants are being expanded in

capability to meet increasing loads, and three entirely
new facilities are in various stages of planning. The total
capacity for the Hampton Roads area facilities will be
180 MGD.
Of course, the large-scale projects in Virginia's urban
areas are the most visible, but the important point is that
the treatment requirements and stream standards imposed under NPDES affect all of the Commonwealth, not
just the urban concentrations. Thus, on a per capita
basis, the requirements are substantially uniform, and
the resident of a small community will feel the impact of
PL 92-500 just as much as the resident of the large city.
What is the nature of this impact? The first aspect is
obviously financial. The $496 million is not "free", since
it comes from the taxpayer's pocket. although there is
some reason to believe that Virginia has wangled a bit of
a "subsidy". In terms of size and popUlation, Virginia is
an "average" state and would thus have expected to
receive about 1 150, or $360 million, of the $18 billion
authorized by PL 92-500. The $496 million actually
received thus can be looked on as· containing a 38%
bonus. But, from another point of view, this federal
largess is also not free since these treatment systems
will not run themselves; for the indefinite future, they will
demand funds for operetion and maintenance that will
have a permanent effect on the utility bills of the averege
citizen.
If the cost of this program is substantial. what of the
benefits? The statistics available to date indicate:
a. from December 1972 to December 1975, the
allowable total flow discharge from Virginia's major
municipal sewage treatment plants (defined as those
with a capacity of 2 MGD or more) as increased from
345 MGD to 424 MGD, a 23% increase; and
b. in the same period, the total pollutant discharge
from these facilities has decreased from 165,000
pounds of BOD per day (a technical measure of pollutant
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quantity) to 120,000 pounds of BOD per day, a 27%
decrease. The performance in this same period for Virginia's major industrial treatment plants shows similar
improvement.
While a 27% decrease in pollutant load is solid progress but still not all that spectacular, it should be noted
that only about 5% of the projects funded by PL 92-500
have been completed; and, while much of this improvement could also be attributed to more vigorous
enforcement of Virginia's water pollution abatement
program, there is little question that the financial, as
opposed to regulatory, aspects of PL 92-500 are beginning to take effect. It is projected that, when the projects
funded by the $496 million federal grants are completed
in 1979, the pollutant discharge from Virginia's major
sewerage treatment plants will be some 90,000 pounds
of BOD per day, a reduction of 45% from December
1972, even though the permitted flow will be 600 MGD,
a 74% increase over the same period.
Finally, if the polhJtant load being discharged into
Virginia's waters is decreasing, what will be the effect on
the quality of Virginia's waters-which, after all, is the
whole point of the pollution abatement exercise? The
information and projectons now available assuming a
continuing federal grant program, indicate this:
Year

1974
1977
1983

Stream-miles not
meeting quality
criteria
2033
1435
96

% of total
Virginia stream
miles
8.4%
5.3%
0.4%

These figures are particularly significant since the
process of setting water quality criteria for the streams of
Virginia is a continuing one, and the tendency over time
is for these standards to become more stringent. Thus,
Virginia's waters are on their way to being cleansed.
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The Future of PL 92-500

The National Study Commission has concluded that
the 1977, 1983 and 1984 goals of PL 92-500 cannot
be met on time. In Virginia alone, there is another $1
billion worth of municipal projects that must be funded if
these goals are to be met. And much further work must
also be done in abating non-poi nt-discharges and toxic
pollution. Unfortunately, the fiscal authorizations under
PL 92-500 have run out, and the President's current
budget requests provide for no additional funds. At this
writing there is substantial sentiment within Congress to
continue the grant program, but it is too early to tell how
much might be provided, if anything.
The ultimate question, one beyond the scope of this
paper to argue, is whether the program is worth continuing. It is interesting to note that the National Study
Commission has massive-sounding funding requirements to meet the affordable goals of PL 92-500, if
they are affordable. For instance, for industrial discharges to meet the 1983 requirements, the annual rate
of inflation for the price of the product of this industry
will be 0.37%-of itself, an acceptable amount.
Similarly, approximately $120 billion will be required in
additional funds to meet the goals for municipal treatment works. But when this is spread out over the eleven
years which will realistically be needed, the financial
requirements come to only 0.9% of the annual
GMP-again, an affordable figure of itself.
The answer to this ultimate question will of course be
determined by many complex factors, including the state
of the economy, shifting public priorities as natural
resources dwindle, the continued social will to reallocate
wealth, and the durability of the environmental ethic.
But, at least the mechanisms have been set up and are
working to assess, on a continuing basis, the rationale
for, and progress of this massive undertaking. Whether
or not the commitment to the goals of PL 92-500 will be
continued will be a significant development, but it is
already significant that PL 92-500, whatever it achieves
in the area of water quality, is teaching us how to
evaluate and utilize governmental programs in a much
more sophisticated way.

STARE
DECISIS
Jane Bedno

A man must love his gentle mate,
Support her, feed her, care for her; 1
For God created female's state,
2
3
Not to compete , but to defer ;
4
And, though now become a person ,
5
Benign rules still protect a lass .
Suspect not her special classification,S
That courtly E.R.A.'s yet to pass' .
Firm male justice rules the nation
8
With wisdom, force, and verbiage ;
The hand that rocked the cradle's passion
9
Is due to a faulty hormonal gauge •

1.

MICHIE. JURISPRUDENCE, Husband and Wife, §21 at
22; but note VA. CODE ANN. 20-61 (1975 Supp.)

2.

Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1949).

3.

Bradwell v. State, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 130, 132,
141 (1872).

4.

United States ex rei. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp.
8, 14 (1968).

5.

Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)

6.

Frontiero v. Richardson, 441 U.S. 677 (1973)

7.

Brown, Ellinger, Falk, Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 Yale LJ. (1971)

8.

Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420, 421, 422
(1907).

9.

G. Murdock, Social Structure in Law: Its Nature,
Functions and Umits (Howard and Summers, ed.
1965).

7

The Duty
to

Rescue

Any student of the law will undoubtedly remember the
1928 tort case Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E.
301 (1928) where defendant, an amusement park employee, rented a canoe to a Mr. Hill, knowing that he was
intoxicated and clearly incapable of safe navigation. Mr.
Hill paddled out a bit and then inadvertently upset the
boat. He clung to the overturned shell for half an hour. all
the while uttering loud cries for help. There were boats
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available for a rescue attempt. Defendant. a peculiarly
endearing type. smoked a cigarette on the dock as Hill
drowned before him. In an apparently incomprehensible
ruling. the court held that the defendant was under no
legal duty to go to his aid. A 1966 case. Handiboe v.
McCarthy. 114 Ca. App. 541. 151 S.E. 2d 905 (1966).
similarly held that a servant was under no duty to rescue
a small child drowning in his master's swimming pool.

In my Torts class, there was a visible reaction of horror
to these unsavory cases. Our moral sensibilities were
deeply offended. Almost instinctively we turned to the
legal system. "There ought to be a law", we cried. Nor
were we alone. Such noted legal commentators as Dean
Prosser and Dean Pound have joined in condemning this,
to them, obvious moral obtuseness in the law.
Prosser, considering as well the case of Yania v. Bigan,
397 Pa. 316,155 A.2d 343 (1959), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found no legal responsibility
upon a defendant for challenging deceased to jump a
wide, dangerous ditch, has commented that "it would be
hard to find a more unappetizing trio of decisions. W.
PROSSER,LAWOFToRTS 340 (4thed. 1971). He has argued
that the results of these decisions derive from an "historical reluctance to countenance non-feasance as a basis
of liability." W. PROSSER, supra, at 340. Pound suggests
that they represent an atavistic remnant of nineteenth
century jurisprudence which manfully tried to separate
legal principles from moral ones R. POUND, LAw AND
MORALS 71-88 passim (2d ed. 1926).
It is arguable, however, that the legal system's failure
to impose an active duty of rescue is perhaps not so
reprehensible as may first appear. In fact, it can be at
least partially explained in terms of contemporary moral,
legal and practical considerations. Obvious moral failings
are not necessarily cured by a reflexive dumping of the
problem into the legal system's collective lap. At times,
there surely must be non-legal solutions to a problem
which are preferable to legal alternatives. The question
is: is this such a time or should there be a legal duty to
rescue?
Modern thinking would have no quarrel with Prosser
if, in fact, old notions of non-feasance accounted for the
absence of such a duty. The individual who is harmed
because someone failed to act is no less injured than the
individual who experienc'es an active assault. If the duty
to rescue were rationalized away upon this basis, and this
basis alone, it would represent a moral and legal abdication of societal responsibility. A further analysis of
the problem, however, shows that the absence of such a
duty derives from more than this archaic distinction.
Pound's blithe explanation does not do justice to the
complexity of the problem. Modern courts do not always
blindly defer to past legal traditions when there is an
obvious and compelling reason to depart therefrom.
No-if modern courts fail to recognize an active duty to
rescue, there must be other considerations which also
come into play.
A starting point must be a consideration of the relationship between our moral and legal systems. Do we,
even in theory, expect our legal system to encompass
wholly our ethical system? Certainly we know that, in
fact, one is not the mirror image of the other. Laws are
not always the state's version of moral precepts although
there are obvious and numerous overlaps. "Thou shalt
not kill" appears in the legal code as a prohibition
against killing with the added promise of state retribution
should its law be violated. But the state, in regulating

relationships between people, also must necessarily deal
with situations devoid of moral content. Rules governing
contractual relationships property relationships, allocation of risk, etc. have frequently developed withou! the
aid of moral guidelines. So, too, there are moral rules
which exist without the benefit of state sanction. Selflessness, the golden rule, the duty to honor one's parents
have not found legal translation to date.
For many of us, this lack of identity is welcomed, for
one man's morality may well be another man's sin. Who
is to decide which moral precepts shall have the force of
law? Should those believing abortion to be immoral have
access to state sanctioning power to impose their beliefs
upon those who believe differently, or has the legal
system wisely left some matters to the realm of moral
persuasion alone? Contrary to Pound's insinuation that
attempts to separate law and morals hark back to Neanderthalic times, POUND, supra, at 77}, many modern
thinkers applaud this trend, at least with respect to laws
regulating sexual mores. Many feel that consenting
adults should be free to determine their own conduct and
moral standards without state interference. This demonstrates at the very least that there is some danger in
assuming that the legal and moral systems should be
ultimately coterminus.
This conclusion does not necessarily resolve our problem as to a duty to rescue. That morality and the legal
system sometimes cover areas unto themselves does not
mean that a duty to rescue should not find expression in
both. Is there any justification for this glaring omission?
There is. It is the intervention of practical considerations
which accounts for the law's apparent callousness. At its
most fundamental level, the duty to rescue defies sound
legislation.

I
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It should be noted that those clamoring for the imposition of such a duty are addressing themselves only to
the situation where rescue would be danger-free for the
rescuer. The law recognizes that it cannot command an
individual to risk, gratuitously, his own life to save
another. (It is interesting to note, however, that our moral
system does ask this of us. Such acts are lauded as truly
heroic, wholly selfless in fact the ultimate moral act; for
what more can a society exact from an individual than his
life?) While imposing a legal duty to rescue would not be
difficult in the above-mentioned cases, the ramifications
of such a duty would be perplexing in two regards: onehow far does this duty extend; and two- what standards
are we to establish to determine whether or not any
danger is present?
It is· impossible to delineate rationally the outer limits
of this duty. Should each friend or casual acquaintance
of the individual who smokes be held ultimately liable for

the Genovese death several years ago where a large
group of New Yorkers watched and listened to a young
woman being murdered below their windows when help
was only a phone call away. Afterwards, people said that
they had not wished to get involved. Involvement for
them probably meant becoming the next victim, an
irrational fear perhaps, but a very real one to many living
in urban America. In the Genovese case, should the
actual on-lookers alone have been condemned? Should
not the city have borne part of the responsibility? If New
Yorkers had felt that they would have been protected,
perhaps they would have been less reluctant to become
"involved. "
If we assume that the duty to rescue presents serious
legislative obstacles, can we content ourselves in its
absence, or should we risk the unknown and attempt to
legislate anyway? Let us return to our defendant who so
calmly smoked his cigarette while another human being

his death from lung cancer? What about the alcoholic
who sits next to you at work? We cannot dismiss these
possibilities by saying that the individuals consciously
choose to kill themselves and that the duty, therefore,
does not extend to them. Few would ever suggest that
we should say to the man about to leap from the ninth
story, "Be my guest."
In addition, is it reasonably possible to limit liability to
an ascertainable group? What about the boulder in the
middle of the road which hundreds of people pass by
during the daytime which becomes a fatal obstacle that
night? If we find one passerby, can we fairly hold him
and only him responsible for the death that ensued?
What standards should be used to determine whether
the would-be rescuer was in danger? Should there be an
objective standard (e.g., reasonable apprehension of
faar) or a subjective one? Delineation of such a standard
would seem to present enormous diffic\llties. Consider

begged for help to save his life. Let us keep in mind that
the same moral sensitivity which is so shocked by
defendant's inaction also recoils from the idea of punishment of "criminals" because it does little to resolve
the problem of crime. What kind of man is our defendant
canoe keeper? Certainly not someone we would care to
dine with. Can we suppose that a legal sanction would
motivate this obviously callous, if not sick, individual to
act? (We no longer believe that laws forbidding murder in
fact prevent murders.) Perhaps legislation would make
us feel better, e.g. "if one amongst us be that indifferent,
know ye that he shall pay"? But what would a law
against indifference accomplish? Aren't we, in fact,
saying, how could anyone, with no danger to himself, not
rescue another? But this is just the point. Those who
would not rescue under such circumstances are, more
likely than not, sick, highly anti-social individuals who
are in need of mental help rather than legal directives.
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Should we draft a law which would essentially address
itself to this small. rather unusual class of people. and
which well may not have any affect on it at all?
Clearly. priorities must be considered. One author
compares the law to a vigilant sheep dog. He points out:
many middle-class Americans feel secure enough from
personal aggression that they forget the wolves around
them and demand that their sheep dog act more like a
solicitous veterinarian. Perhaps he should: nevertheless.
statistics and case histories of violent crime indicate that
our society still needs canina teeth in guard to protect
it-not against the psssive indifference of the pssser-by
but against the active assault of tha robbers. rapists and
murderars.·· EDMOND CAHN. THE MORAL DECISION (1955).

If we assume that criminal laws do affect behaviour •. and
that the imposition of a duty to rescue would save lives.
then perhaps the question is one of selectivity. Obviously. any legal code cannot cover all instances of injury to
another. Are the circumstances here such as to warrant a
law or are there other acts. more destructive of the social
fabric. which occur more frequently and thereby demand priority treatment? In the last analysis. one
might conclude that the situations where there is no
danger-real or imagined-are infrequent and therefore
not totally deserving of legal sanction. On the other
hand. one life saved is probably reason enough for a law.
Casting aside practical considerations, one must finally
ask philosophically what such legislation would do to us
as moral beings. Mr. Cahn provides a valuable insight as
he discusses an episode from Fielding's Joseph Andrews
(CAHN. supra, at 187-91). Joseph had been set upon by
thieves and stripped of all possessions, including his
clothes. A stagecoach passed by and, at first. none of the
passengers expressed the slightest inclination to help.

Afterward., people
said that thev
had not wanted

to get inllo/lled.

The coachmen wanted a fare. the woman passenger was
offended by his nakedness, and an elderly passenger was
afraid of being robbed. "However. it happened that one
of the unsympathetic passengers was a young lawyer, a
very cautious lawyer at that. He warned the others that if
Joseph should die. they might be proved to have been
the last in his company and might be called to account
for his death." (Supra. at 188). Fear of prosecution
rather than any moral impulse finally convinced the
passengers to take Joseph in.
As Cahn points out, the passengers' initial decision not
to let Joseph in was unenlightened selfishness while their
ultimate decision to let him ride with them was merely
enlightened selfishness. Any attempt to impose a legal
sanction may curb behaviour such as with the Fielding
story but it will not elevate man's morality. It will provide
one more instance of doing something because it is
required by law rather than by an individual's moral
dictates. In a sense, it robs the individual of his moral
satisfaction-it takes the fun out of being moral. On the
other hand. it would surely be ridiculous to sacrifice lives
for the sake of any moral gratification. The question is
really, would such a law save lives? Would Mr. Canoe
Keeper have behaved any differently if there had been a
law on the books?
On further reflection. the question of imposing a legal
duty to rescue is more difficult than it would first appear.
The absence of the legal duty does not automatically
make the common law immoral or amoral. Rather. it
could show that the law is. above all else. practical and it
would prefer to remain silent rather than to speak badly.
Perhaps the law has deferred to other social mechanisms
recognizing that law alone cannot solve all human problems or achieve all desired social objectiVes. Can we
really say that in making this choice. the law was unwise?
11

POSITIVE EUGENICS

AND THE LAW
Mark Horoschak
The term "eugenics" was coined by Sir Francis Galton
in 1883 to denote the study and manipulation of factors
that improve hereditary qualities. The goal of negative
eugenics is the diminution· of inferior genetic qualities.
Positive eugenics, on the other, hand, entails the
propagation of superior genes.
Initially, interest in eugenics centered on the negative
aspect of the science, that is the reduction of totally
dependent individuals who are born into the world only
to suffer and be cared for by society. The n'gative
eugenics movement reached its zenith in the early
twentieth century when organizations like the International Eugenics Congress were formed to combat genetic
degeneration. The Congress favored premarital syphilis
tests, incest prohibi1ions, antimiscegenation laws and
sterilization statutes. To a large degree the Congress
succeeded in achieving its goals. The Wasserman test
was instituted, incest and antimiscegenation laws were
enacted, and statutes providing for the sterilization of
mental defectives and criminals became commonplace.
The Congress, however, was a casualty of the Second
World War. The horrible experience of the Nazi Rassenhygiene resulted in a distaste for genetic experimentation
shared by scientist and layman alike.
The realities of our modern age have rekindled interest
in genetic engineering. Genes are chemical substances
that are not completely stable. Mutations may occur from
chemical imbalances or radiation during the reproductive
process. Radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, medical
X-rays and chemicel additives in food are largely responsible for the increased "genetic load" and, hence,
the increased rete of mutation. Today about one child in
1
twenty is born with a discernible genetic defect. Still
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others die before birth because of the disruptive impact
mutations have on genetic coordination.
Recognition of the implications of the genetic load
problem has prompted research in the area of positive
eugenics. The most recent developments in this field are
collectively known as cloning. The term "cloning,"
which means "cutting," is a botanical term that refers to
a type of asexual reproduction that is characterized by
the creation of individuals that are derived from a single
parent and genetically identical to that parent. The
cloning process may be divided into two stages. Enucleation involves the removal of the nucleus from a
female egg (a sex cell is "haploid," containing only one
set of chromosomes). The second stage, known as ranucleation calls for replacement of the egg nucleus by the
nucleus from an adult body cell (a "diploid cell," having
both sets of chromosomes) of the prospective parent.
Cloning experimentation on plant and lower forms of
animal life has been successful in reproducing genetically identical progeny.
THE CASE FOR BANNING HUMAN
GENETIC EXPERIMENTATION
As of the time of this writing, a considerable furor has
arisen in the academic community over the question of
whether to commence human cloning experimentation.
Prominent men of science: Dr. Leon Kass, the executive
secretary of the Committee for the Life Sciences and
Social Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, Dr.
James D. Watson, the Nobel laureate molecular
biologist, and prominent theologian Professor Paul
Ramsey have urged a total prohibition of human cloning.

In support of this proposal, they have raised several
serious scientific objections. One objection is that the
identification of genetically superior persons to be the
subjects of a positive eugenics program is exceedingly
difficult. A person with superior genes may exhibit
qualities associated with inferior genetic stock because of
poor diet, limited education, or lack of adequate medical
care. Furthermore, at present, scientists suffer from vast
gaps of knowledge with respect to the effects of genetic
2
manipulation. Traits useless to one generation may be
essential to a succeeding generation. The fate of the
human race would be determined by myopic scientific
controls. Similarly, scientists are uncertain as to the
3
interactions of genes. Most traits are polygenic. Thus,
the desirable genotype chosen for replication might carry
with it undesirable side traits.
Perhaps the most serious indictment of such a program is that clonal decisions would not rest on valid
scientific grounds independent of the social and philosophical biases of the controllers. A classic example of
the interjection of philosophical bias in the gene selection
process is the disparity between the 1935 and 1959 lists
of ideal genotypes compiled by Professor H. J. Muller, a
prominent geneticist. In 1935 Professor Muller was an
avowed Marxist. Not surprisingly, Marx and Lenin were
listed as desirable genotypes to be propagated. By 1959
his political views had mellowed. This change was
reflected in his revised list, which omitted Marx and
4
Lenin and included Lincoln and Descartes.
The danger of changing societal values affecting clonal
decisions is as much an ethical consideration as scientific. In the absence of a detailed proposal for an institutionalized framework, it is difficult to discuss the question
of democratic control and safeguards against abuse.
Certainly the benevolence of Professor Muller is no
guarantee against abuse by a state subject to changing
ideals and tastes.
Cloning would have a devastating impact on the
Anglo-American concept of individuality. The sanctity of
individuality finds expression in the Declaration of
Independence:

While the quintessential scientific question is "Can
man play God1", the paramount ethical concern is
"Should man play God?" The question is easier to
answer in the affirmative when we envision a genetic
engineering program improving human intellectual skills
and generally enhancing the quality of life. It stands to
reason, however, that everyone cannot be Einstein or a
Beethoven. Nor would the controllers opt for such a
society, for the delegation of the menial but necessary
tasks of society to gifted clonants would arouse their
rebellious instincts. It follows that the controllers would
have to clone a certain percentage of mediocre or inferior
human beings as well as geniuses. Whether one man
should so preordain another's fate is a question of deep
religious and ethical significance.

In democratic societies there is a fundamental belief in

the uniqueness of the individual, his basic dignity and
worth as 8 human being, and in the need to maintain

social processas that safeguard his sacred individuality."

Genetic fabrication is a form of determinism. Societal
pressures would likely deprive the clonant of personal
autonomy by channeling all his energies in a predetermined course. For example, a young Einstein cion ant
would be "encouraged" to study mathematics and
physics. This denial of free will to the clonant might also
lead to widespread self-degradation. Cloning technology
is capable of destroying the intuitive sense of individuality. Consequently, a clonant would tend to perceive himself less a human being than a manufactured
product. In short, cloning might cause a substantial
erosion of human dignity.

"Thus. the desirable genotype chosen
might carry with it undesirable side
traits."
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II

It must be concluded that these

justifications are not suffident
to deprive the individual of
dvilliberties, "

CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS
Let us suppose Congress enacted legislation creating a
compulsory positive eugenics program. The constitutionality of such legislation could be challenged on
several possible grounds.
The right of privacy is implicitly recognized in the First,
Fourth, Fifth. and Ninth Amendments. Specifically. the
right to control one's reproductive functions has been
held to fall within the "penumbra" of the First Amendment guarantees.' In Skinnerv. Oklahoma s the Supreme
Court struck down a statute providing for sterilization of
habitual criminals on the ground that the statute violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one

of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race. The power to steriliza. if exercised. may hava subtla
far-reaching and devastating effect.. In evil Dr reckless
hands it can cause races Dr types which a, inimical to the
dominant group to wither and disappear.

In Griswold v Connecticut8 the Court asserted that the
fundamental right of marital privacy was within the
"penumbra" of the First Amendment. Eisenstadt v.
Bairr/ extended this penumbra to envelope sexual intercourse in general. The right of privacy in heterosexual
matters. however. is not absolute. As noted by the Court
in Roe v. Wade 'O a statute impinging upon the reproductive capacity will be upheld if it is representative
of a "compelling state interest. ,,11 In addition. the statue
must be nar~owly drawn to achieve the state's purpose;
that is. there should not be a less onerous alternative for
implementing the legislative goal. 12
Clearly a statute regulating the fundamental right of
procreation would be violative of the First Amendment
unless a compelling justification for the imposition of
genetic controls were shown. One author has suggested
that the reduction of human suffering would qualify as a
state interest sufficient to justify a deprivation of fun13
damental rights. Not all would find this interest "compalling." Initially it would be necessary to try to balance
the suffering caused by the deprivation of the right to
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have children against the possible suffering of a child
who may be born with a genetic disease. Then it would
be necessary to address the question of whether life for a
child with a genetic disease or defect is preferable to no
life at all. In the case of sickle-cell anemia. for example,
the state interest in preventing procreation by afflicted
parents is particularly weak since the child has only a
twenty five per cent chance of inheriting the disease.
A second possibility might be the recognition of a
governmental economic interest in preventing the birth
of children with genetic diseases and defects; but it
cannot be said with any certainty that the government
will bear the costs of their care. A direct economic
interest of the government would exist only insofar as the
prospective parents might be impoverished; but a statute
denying a couple the right to procreate solely because of
indigency would violate the Equal Protection Clause. 14
Still another proposed justification is that a statute
instituting a compulsory positive eugenics program
would safeguard public health and welfare. However. as
mentioned previously. no adequate scientific basis for
the imposition of genetic controls has yet been demonstrated. We simply have not guaranteed that the incidence of inferior genes would be reduced without
deleterious side effects. Also, absent adequate scientific
bases for the controls. the program would inevitably be
administered on the basis of half baked medical notions
and socio-political theories. It must be concluded that
these justifications also are not sufficiently compelling to
'deprive the individual of fundamental civil liberties.
Arguably. positive eugenics statutes would violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
appears clear that when the state dictates what kind of
people will be produced it has created classes of people
who are not equal. Such a statutory discrimination will
be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause only where
rationally founded. '5 The denial of a particular class of
the right to reproduce because "their kind" are not
needed at the time might well be considered patently
unreasonable.

A statute creating a compulsory positive eugenics
program would likely contravene the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment has been described by
one commentator as the "constitutional repository of our
notions of free will and personal autonomy . . . ,,16
Genetic determinism would be incompatible with our
conception of free will and would impair the individual's
internal autonomy, thereby deleteriously affecting external autonomy-that is, the exercise of one's civil liberties. The designation of genotypic inferiority would
create a "badge
slavery;" the denial of eugenic
technology to a designated class would constitute an
unconstitutional form of oppression. This expansive view
of the Thirteenth Amendment beyond dejure enslavement is consistent with a recent interpretation of the
amendment in Jones v. Alfred Mayer CO.,17 where the
Supreme Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting
housing discrimination on the ground that such discrimination in our modern society was a "badge or
incident of slavery. "

of

A state program for positive eugenics is unlikely to
comport with the anti-aristocratic and anti-elitest values
of the Nobility Clause of the Constitution.'s The Nobility
Clause evinces the American aversion to a class receiving
special privileges. By virtue of its designation of a
genetically superior group, positive eugenics arguably
has a constitutionally impermissible purpose under the
Nobility Clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORTS
The right of privacy, guarantee of equal protection
under the law, and prohibitions against enslavement and
a privileged class afford a formidable constitutional
argument for banning in toto human genetic engineering. However, a meritorious constitutional argument
against a total prohibition of positive eugenics can be
made.

The Griswold-Eisenstadt- Wade trilogy is not necessarily applicable to the case of positive eugenics. Griswold may be distinguished in that a positive eugenics
program (cloining or in vitro fertilization, for example)
may not involve marital rights but rather the rights of one
parent. Similarly, while Eisenstadt protects the right to
have sex without children, it does not consider the
question of children without sex. Wade merely stands for
the proposition that a woman has a right to have autonomy over her body. Wade is clearly inapposite to in vitro
births. Furthermore, the right of privacy arguably is
counterbalanced by our time-honored tradition of
academic freedom. In Griswold Justice Douglas argued
that the First Amendment is sufficiently broad to protect
"freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom
to teach ... indeed, the freedom of the entire university
community. ,,19 A total prohibition of eugenics experimentation would violate this fundamental freedom of
academic inquiry.
Moreover, the denial of equal protection argument is

specious. Admittedly, legislation which denied benefits
and imposed burdens on the basis of race was irrational
because race is unrelated to a person's ability to perform,
his contributions to society or any other quality which
would justify the discrimination. Eugenics legislation,
however, would be rational to the extent that fundamental rights of persons would be abridged only to
prevent their passing deleterious genes to future generations. A eugenics statute designed to filter out undesirable genes would, on its face, no more constitute a denial
of equal protection than would the denial of a driver's
license by reason of the operator's physical deformities.
The Supreme Court has upheld negative eugenics
legislation on the ground that the stete interest in controlling genetic diseases justifies the statutory discimination. In Buck v. Belfo the Court upheld a Virginia statute
providing for the sterilization, in state supported institutions, of inmates who were adjudged to have had a
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hereditary form of insanity or imbecility, The petitioner
was a feebleminded woman in a state institution,
daughter of another feebleminded inmate and the
mother of an illegitimate feebleminded child. Speaking
for the majority, Justice Holmes declared:
It is belter for all the world. if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime. or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing ~~eir kind ... Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.

The Buck rationale that the state may exercise its police
power to promote public health and welfare may be
applicable in the case of a positive eugenics statute.

EUGENICS CONTROL LEGISLATION

Several authorities have suggested that a positive
eugenics program should be made available to the public
22
on a voluntary basis. Surely a voluntary program would
obviate both the constitutional barrier of the fundamental
right to procreate and opposition from those in the
religious community who believe that procreation is the
highest form of love. A financial incentive in the form of
greater tax deductions for participants has been urged,
but while greater tax deductions might induce the rich to
participate in the program, they would fail in being any
incentive for the poor. In the final analysis. most Americans are probably not prepared to voluntarily change their
attitudes toward reproduction. "It is doubtful that a
discriminatory program would be voluntarily accepted by
those against whom it discriminated. ,,23 In short. a
voluntary program would be inconsistent. uneven and
largely ineffectual in operation,
A desirable alternative to either a complete ban on
human genetic experimentation or a voluntary eugenics
program is limited governmental control of eugenics
research. Governmental intervention into the area of
scientific research and experimentation could be justified
on the ground that misdirected applications of positive
eugenics would constitute a serious and imminent
danger to the public health and morals. Such an interest.
if adequately shown. has long been recognized by the
tourts as sufficiently compelling to permit social
controlS,2. Thus, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts 2S the
Supreme Court held that a compulsory vaccination law
was a reasonable regulation established to protect public
health and safety and, therefore. not in derogation of due
process rights.
One commentator has concluded that "the law must
react before it is placed in the position of having to
accept genetic engineering rather than to choose. ,,26 The
problem. however, is not simply resolved by passing
legislation providing for controls on scientific research. A
compelling state interest for legislating social control
must be shown. A mere possibility of genetic disaster. a
danger not "imminent," may not be a sufficient justification for research controls. Sadly enough. it might be
only after a genetic mishap that a state interest would
become sufficiently compelling for control legislation to
withstand the scrutiny of the courts.
In the interim, funding policies may indeed channel
eugenics research and development. The percentage of
research funds from private origins has steadily declined
in the past decade. It has been estimated that. since
1966. 59 per cent of all medical research grants were
federal in origin. 27 The allocation of these massive funds
is an effective method of curtailin9 "undesirable" research. The drawback of this method. however, is the
lack of any official accountability for manifest abuses of
discretion.
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PROPOSED SOLUTION
With some reservations it is submitted that the only
effective solution to the problem of anticipating and
channeling developments in genetic engineering is the
2a
creation of a federal eugenics control board. The board
would be interdisciplinary in character. comprised of
scientists. lawyers. theologians. philosophers. social
scientists and laymen. Terms of office would be so
staggered as to prevent manipulation of the board by an
incumbent political faction. Its function would be to
consider and determine standards for the denial of
procreation and for genetic experimentation. Specific
rulings would be reviewable by federal district courts.
An administrative agency has the inherent advantages
of expertise and permanence. Rigid statutory mandates
are inadequate in dealing with the rapidly expanding
field of genetics. Ultimately. the effectiveness of such a
board depends on whether the scientific community is
willing to cooperate in the venture. If scientists perceive
the board as a cumbersome bureaucracy stifling
academic inquiry. or if in fact it is. the possibility of
controlling positive eugenics research and experimentation will be greatly diminished.

One commentator has remarked. "Unrestricted scientific research must be allowed. for if law or the threat of
law immobilizes science. the future of mankind is not
promising but dismal. .. 21 Nonetheless. it is a maxium of
human history that first man creates and then he
regulates. No field of human endeavor is free from fegal
constraints. Moreover. while the thought of regulation of
scientific research is abhorrent. the implications of genetic engineering-the denial of free will. of an intuitive
sense of individuality and of the right to procreate.
self-degradation. a compassionless society-requires
legal controls on genetic experimentation. As Chief
Justice Burger has stated:
Science unrestrained would be somewhat like an absolute monarch-a great aarvant. but a terrible master.
Law is inherently restraint; it is a restraint on kings.
congre.ses and presidents . . . Those who become
impetient with the slow pece of the law's responaa to the
need. of science must remember that the history of
Westem philosophy shows that we cherish many values
above scientifIC 3Sdvances: sciencs must function within
thIS framework.

This author supports the latter perspective.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Morality

of Suicide
R. Gregory Barton

A pilot alone in a large plane experiences a complete
engine malfunction over a heavily populated area. Instead of bailing out to safety and possibly allowing the
plane to kill many people, he remains in the plane and
steers it into neighboring mountains, killing himself.' A
man with a large family discovers that he has a long-term
illness that will require exorbitant medical care. Lacking
medical insurance, or appropriate life insurance, the man
kills himself rather than subjecting his family to possible
financial ruin.
In time of war, a secret agent is captured by the
enemy. Fully aware that torture and truth serums will
cause him to reveal information extremely damaging to
the cause he believes in, he kills himself. In primitive
tribes, old men voluntarily leave the tribe and starve or
freeze to death in times of famine so that younger
members of the tribe can survive.
Suicide is regarded by contemporary Western man
with instinctive horror and dread, primarily because it
intransigently rejects our deeply-held impulses of selfpreservation. We conceive of suicide in tragic terms, the
victim being one who must have acted in a moment of
deep despair and great irrationality if not insanity. The
suicide troubles and appalls us because his action
squarely contradicts our conviction that life must be
worth living. For these reasons suicide is presently
viewed as a serious social problem and contemporary
concern with suicide primarily focuses on its prevalence
and prevention.
However, . suicide may also be viewed in a moral
context: For centuries man has debated over whether or
not the intentional killing of oneself may be morally
justified. This debate has been recently intensified by the
rapid development of modern medicine Which, in greatly
prolonging the duration of human life, has perhaps made
the idea of suicide more attractive to those facing years of
grave illness or debilitating old age. Let us attempt to
examine suicide from an historic and philosophic perspective to analyze the legal and moral issues raised by
the concept of self-destruction.
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Societal responses to the act of self-destruction in the
past have ranged from outright condemnation as absolute sin on the one hand, to acceptance and incorporation into the social and moral code on the other. As a
form of human behavior, suicide apparently is as old as
man himself. Anthropological studies have established
that suicide has been practiced for thousands of years in
primitive and historic societies.
During the time of the ancient Greeks and Romans,
suicide, although never actually encouraged, nevertheless was often considered socially acceptable. Honor
suicides to avoid capture and humiliation by the enemy
were apparently frequent and approved of by contemporaries. On the Greek island of Keos, persons over sixty
years of age were expected to poison themselves with
hemlock when it was obvious that they were no longer
socially useful or productive. Furthermore, certain
schools of philosophers such as the Epicureans and the
Roman Stoics advocated suicide as a reasonable exercise
of human freedom.
Suicide was not originally condemned by the establishment of the new religion, Christianity. In fact, suicide
may have been fairly common among early Christians
since it appeared to provide a quick route to the afterlife
of eternal bliss. The eventual Christian doctrine on
suicide was originally formulated by St. Augustine
(354-430) in The City of God. Augustine condemned
suicide on three grounds: that it violated the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" , that it precluded any opportunity for repentance, and that it was a cowardly act.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) enlarged upon Augustine's views by condeming suicide because it was detrimental to the community and because it usurped God's
prerogative to determine man's fate. This AugustineAquinas pOSition on suicide remains to this day that of
Christianity. Intentional self-destruction is a sin because
it is a violation of the fifth commandment, a usurpation of
God's prerogative, and a social wrong.
With the gradual emergence of the Renaissance there
developed challenges to the orthodox Christian views on
the sinfulness of suicide. In 1516, Sir Thomas Moore in
Utopia recommended suicide for those suffering from
incurable and painful diseases. In the early seventeenth
century, John Donne published Biathanatos, a com-

"For centuries man has debated
over whether or not the
intentional killing of oneself
may be morally justified"

LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

3

In accordance with religious condemantion of suicide.
the English common law subjected the person who of
sound mind took his own life to severe post-mortem
penalties. First. the suicide was declared to be guilty of a
felony. Next. the suicide was subject to civil penalties
which included forfeiture of land. and goods to the
Crown. Finally. as Blackstone reports in his Commentaries (Oxford: IV. 190). the suicide was buried not in the
churchyard. but in the highway with a stake driven
through the body. The last practice was a pagan tradition
to keep the ghost from returning to earth. Blackstone's
presentation of the reasons behind the common law
condemnation of suicide is instructive as to the importance of religious considerations.
And also the law of England wisely and religiously
considers that no man hath a power to destroy life. but by
commission from God. the author of it; and as the suicide
is guilty of double offence. one spiritual. in invading the
prerogative of the Almighty. and rushing into his im·
mediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal.
against the King. who hath an interest in the preservation
of all his subjectS. the law has therefore ranked it among
the highest crimes. making it 8 peculiar species commit·
ted on one's self. (Commentaries: IV. 189).

prehensive defense of suicide designed to prove that
self-destruction was not incompatible with the laws of
reason or of God. In the eighteenth century. Voltaire.
Montesquieu and Hume all at some time in their careers
defended the act of suicide. In the nineteenth century.
Schopenhauer vigorously advocated suicide since life
was similar to an unpleasant dream. the sooner ended
the better. As a gross generalization. one may state that a
number of contemporary writers have relegated suicide
to a question of personal choice that requires no moral
justification.
In certain non-Western societies. suicide has not
traditionally been regarded as a moral wrong or sin. For
example. in Japan and India. voluntary self-destruction
(hari-kari or settee in the respective countries) was once
viewed as a somewhat honorable act. often available to
the nobility as a means to remove the stigma for past
misdeeds. In certain Eskimo civilizations. aged members
were expected to voluntarily leave camp and freeze to
death so that others could exist within available food
supplies.
Thus. even a cursory examination of suicide as practiced in the past reveals that by no means have all people
considered suicide as an absolute moral wrong. In contrast to the Christian condemnation of suicide. some
societies have accepted and even approved of the act of
intentional self-destruction.

Since suicide was a felony at common law, an attempt
to commit suicide was a misdemeanor. Also. one who
encouraged and assisted another to commit suicide was
guilty of a felony. as a principal if he was present at the
act which caused death. and as an accessory before the
fact if he was not present when the suicide was committed. Thus, at common law, if two entered into a
suicide pact and only one was successful. the other
would be gUilty of murder.
Present English law still classifies suicide as a felony
although no forfeiture of goods nor ignomious burial are
involved. The major legal effect is the avoidance of life
insurance policies on the principle that a man may not
profit by his own criminal act. Attempted suicide is still
viewed as a common law misdemeanor and aiding and
abetting suicide will result in severe criminal penalties.
Unlike other areas of the common law. the English
rules on suicide were not generally adopted in the United
States. fn 1660. Massachusetts pessed a statute proscribing a Christian burial for suicides and decreeing thet
they should be buried in the highway with a cartload of
stones on the grave as a mark of infamy. However. the
statute was not adopted in other states and was eventually repealed,
The present law on suicide in the United States has
many points of conflict and confusion. In the majority of
the states. suicide is not a crime. while a small minority
of states such as New Jersey still classify suicide as a
felony. In the case of attempted suicide. the majority rule
is that it is not criminal. although a minority classify it as
a misdemeanor. Since a majority of states do not make
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suicide criminal, then theoretically aiding and abetting it
should not be either; but the majority of states have
avoided this logical conclusion by making the assistance
of a suicide a separate criminal offense. In fact, in some
states, aiding, abetting or inciting a suicide may be
murder in the first degree.
In evaluating Anglo-American law on suicide, one is
impressed most of all with the basic irrelevance of the
criminal law to the subject. It is obvious that making
suicide a criminal offense serves no social purpose
whatsoever, since a man soon deceased could not possibly be deterred by the threat of penal measures. In the
case of attempted suicide, having the law promise to
punish the potential suicide if he should fail in his
attempt may only serve the purpose of insuring that the
person genuinely intending to end his own life will do a
good job of it. Thus, it appears absurd to talk in terms of
deterrence in relation to suicide or attempted suicide
since it is inconceivable that a potential suicide or
attempted suicide would seriously consider the possibilities of criminal punishment.
The only other possible argument for the retention of
the crime of .attempted suicide is that it may enable
medical treatment to be given to the attempter. However,
there are obviously ways of insuring that needy people
receive medical attention other than first making them
criminals. Furthermore, although this paper will not
discuss the causes of suicide, recent studies have refuted
past contentions that all suicides are insane and have
found, that in fact, only a very small percentage of
suicides are caused by insanity.
Moreover, a substantial number of suicides may be
called "rational suicides" since the competent individual
involved carefully weighs the attractiveness of life and
death and opts for the latter. In such situations, medical
treatment would not appear to be extremely helpful.
Thus, the criminal law is basically irrelevant in regard
to the potential suicide, since criminalizing the acts of
suicide or attempted suicide serves no real social purpose. However, in regard to the criminalizing of the acts
of aiding, abetting or. inciting a suicide, the law may be
relevant. The individual assisting a suicide, if he is not
also attempting to commit suicide as part of a suicide
pact, obviously plans to survive the suicide and hence
deterrence may be a factor. Assuming there is a social
interest in the life of the individual. the legal system is
justified in making assistance of a suicide a crime since it
may prevent 11 suicide that would otherwise be committed. However, outside this limited area of assistance of a
suicide, the law appears to be basically irrelevant to the
concept of self-destruction.
MORAL PERSPECTIVE
In examining suicide from a moral perspective, it
appears impossible to generalize categorically on the
morality of the act of intentional self-destruction. While
in the past certain theologians and philosophers such as
St. Augustine and Immanuel Kant have posited that
suicide in all circumstances is morally wrong, it would
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appear that, upon careful consideration, such an absolute position would today have to be qualified by even
the most adamant moral critic of suicide.
In each of the deaths described at the beginning of this
article, there are acts of suicide or intentional self-destruction. However, it would appear that few of us would
characterize all these actions as morally wrong. In fact,
regardless of the wisdom of the specific acts involved,
most of us would probably characterize at least several of
them as heroic self-sacrifices to save others. Thus, it is
impossible to stereotype all suicides categorically as
immoral actions.
Acknowledging that suicide may not .always be morally
wrong, may one state that it is morally wrong for an
individual to take his own life for reasons of his own
personal welfare? Putting aside religious considerations,
the morality of an act would seem to be determined by its
social consequences. Suppose an individual without
acquaintances or family drowns himself in the middle of
the ocean. The action is so far removed from society that
there is no problem of a social nusiance, and actually no
one else is affected at all since no one knew of either the
man or his suicide. One may argue that society has lost a
protentially useful citizen and in fact this appears to have
been Blackstone's "temporal" reason for denouncing
suicide. However, in these days of overpopulation such a
contention would appear frivolous. The action may
realistically be viewed as void of significant social consequences and for this reason a morally neutral action. In
other words, since the individual's action has neither hurt
nor harmed anyone else, his suicide would not necessarily appear to be morally wrong.
Perhaps the best generalization that can be made
concerning the morality of suicide is that intentional
self-destruction is not justified when made for personal
reasons and where the act adversely affects third persons. For example, suppose a supporter of a large family
decides that because of the tensions and frustrations of
modern society he will kill himself. However, by killing
himself he voids his life insurance policies and leaves his
dependents totally without financial support. Moreover,
he leaves his friends and family with deep and permanent feelings of sorrow, pain, guilt and even embarrassment. Here the suicide may be viewed as a selfish and
immoral act. For the purpose of permanently relieving his
anxieties, the individual has directly caused others serious financial and emotional problems. Thus, the argument that suicide is morally wrong when it is committed for personal reasons and when it adversely affects
other people may have some logic to it. Still, even this
generalization may fall in certain circumstances, and an
appropriate area in which to examine this proposition is
that of euthanatic suicide.
"Euthanatic suicide", or "active euthanasia" stands
for the intentional self-destruction of individuals suffering
from an incurable disease or facing impending death
who choose suicide rather than endure extended suffering. Euthanatic suicide is really suicide to escape a
miserable life.

The moral problems raised by euthanatic suicide are
easily resolved if everyone involved agrees that the
individual should be encouraged to take his own life. For
example. if the family and friends of the gravely-ill
individual decide that he should be allowed to commit
suicide rather than face extended and unnecessary
agony. it would be difficult to characterize the suicide as
a moral wrong. However. difficulties will arise if the
euthanatic suicide will adversely affect third persons. and
merely by characterizing the death as suicide may trouble
and embarrass next of kin and close acquaintances.
In such situations. it appears that the moral problem
can only be resolved by a difficult balancing process. On
the one hand. it is true that an euthanatic suicide may
have moral consequences in that third parties can be
adversely affected. On the other hand. a euthanatic
suicide may save the individual from an extremely pain"
ful and miserable death. In some circumstances. the
individual may feel that it is morally required for him to
endure this painful death. He may know that suicide
would void insurance policies his family desperately
requires. or that suicide would cause irreparable emotional damage to his family. On the other hand. there
may be circumstances in which euthanatic suicide would
not appear to categorically be a moral wrong. If serious
financial considerations are not relevant. and if the
feelings and dispositions of friends and family would be
only marginally affected. the euthanatic suicide would
cause grevious social consequences. In certain circumstances then. even when third parties are adversely
affected it would be difficult to characterize the euthanatic suicide as morally wrong when a great deal of agony
and suffering may be avoided. Resolution of the moral
issue will depend upon the specific circumstances
involved.
Very similar to. and perhaps included in. the concept
of euthanatic suicide is intentional self-destruction to
avoid debilitating old age. In this situation. the individual
involved may have led a happy and productive life; but
with the oncoming of old age and its corrresponding
severe limitations. the individual may wish to die in
peace and with dignity. Such feelings may be more
common today as. with rapid development of medical
technology. people may be kept alive longer than they
really desire.
A much-publicized example of such a suicide was that
of Dr. and Mrs. Henry P. Van Dusen in early 1975. Dr.
Van Dusen. the former president of Union Theological
School. and his wife swallowed overdoes of sleeping pills
in an effort to carry out a suicide pact. In a suicide note.
the Van Dusens explained that they had entered a pact
rather than face the prospect of old age. At the time of
her death. Mrs. Van Dusen was lame because of an
arthritic condition. and Dr. Van Dusen had been rendered
virtually speechless and inactive because of a stroke
suffered years earlier.

Otherwise. the Van Dusens were not in such poor
health as to be facing impending death. However. both
the Van Dusens had been vigorous scholars. and their
recent physical handicaps had totally deprived them of
the useful and active lives to which they had become
accustomed. With only the prospect of slow deterioration
for the future. they decided they would die together
rather than face enfeebling old age.
As with any suicide. a suicide to avpid debilitating old
age such as the Van Dusens does not appear to be
morally wrong if there are no significant social consequences. If the suicide does not adversely affect
anyone else. then it is difficult to see why the act is
wrong in itself. On the other hand. if the suicide does
somewhat injure third persons. it appears that again a
balancing process is required to weigh the benefits
sought by the suicide against the supposed adverse
effects suffered by third parties. As with euthanatic
suiCide. there does appear to be some legitimacy and
justification for suicide to avoid debilitating old age. It is
natural for one to wish to die in dignity; many people
accustomed to active useful lives would not relish the
idea of years of a demeaning and meaningless existence
as one merely a burden upon others. Perhaps in certain
situations these considerations would outweigh any
slight discomfort or embarassment suffered by friends or
family of the suicide. The moral evaluation must be
determined upon consideration of the specific circumstances involved.
Man's attitudes on suicide have varied drastically over
the centuries. usually according to socilH:ultural factors.
The concept of intentional self-destruction has been
categorically condemned on the one hand. and accepted
and approved of as part of a social code on the other.
Perhaps only two basic conclusions can be reached
concerning suicide: First of all. because of its extreme
and permanent characteristics. suicide does not appear, .
to be effectively subject to man's legal systems. Second.
because of its complexity. suicide does not appear to be
effectively subject to moral generalizations. The morality
of suicide can only be judged in specific factual situations
after careful consideration of the personal reasons and
social consequences involved.
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SeDli-Student
Bargaining
Kathleen Nixon

. ASSISTANT, INTERN AND RESIDENT GROWTH

Recent expansion in public sector employment has
been accompanied by increased collective bargaining.
This surge in unionization has resulted from management's failure. through its dogged adherence to an
absolutist management ethic. to perceive employees'
changing economic and attitudinal needs. This failure.
coupled with recent legislative enactments recognizing
public sector bargaining rights. has fostered union
growth and is assuring its institutional legitimacy. '
Accompanying this growth in public sector unionization have been the efforts by ind}viduals not traditionally
regarded as employees to improve their status by collective bargaining. Graduate Assistants. Medical Interns
and Residents. in particular, although enjoying a dual
"student employee" status. have sought collective
representation as a means of improving their professional
and economic standing. To date, employer reception to
such bargaining has generally been hostile on the bases
that Assistants. Residents and Interns are not "employees" as defined in state public employment laws. or
if "employees." they lack a sufficient community of
interest to warrant independent organization or inclusion
in faculty or hospital bargaining units. Management's
consistent and adamant opposition, however. has not
successfully checked bargaining attempts. Assistants
and Interns are increasingly unionizing as their numbers
and disaffection with management grow.
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Graduate Assistants. Medical Interns and Residents
exist in substantial numbers both absolutely and relative
to university and hospital staffs. At the University of
Wisconsin there are now more than 1.800 Teaching
Assistants. 2 while the Universities of Indiana and Mi4
chigan respectively have 1.7003 and 2.200 Graduate
Teaching and Research Assistants. These numbers are
steadily increasing as is the proportion of Graduate
Assistants to faculty members. At Fordham University
5
there are now 150 Assistants to 501 instructors and
8
Adelphi University has 125 Assistants to a staff of 338.
The size of Intern and Resident classes is likewise
substantial. At a recent medical conference in Washington, D.C. attendant spokesmen represented 18.000 of
thenation's 56.000 Interns and Residents, indicating
7
their national strength. Comparatively. their numbers
are equally significant. as is evidenced by the University
of Michigan Hospital Center where 650 Interns. Residents and Post-Doctoral Fellows compare with 300
s
staff physicians. These numbers of Graduate Assistants.
Medical Interns and Residents indicate their extent of use
by management as well as potential bargaining strength.
However. numbers alone do not dictate degree of unionization. Much of the current impetus behind Assistant. Intern and Resident collective bargaining stems
from increased numbers coupled with imbalances among
these individuals' acaderr.ic qualifications, assigned
duties and professional status.

GRADUATE ASSISTANT UNREST
The graduate Assistantship is a university program
designed to attract top doctoral candidates by providing
them stipends and free or reduced tuition. Universities'
use of this program increases with undergraduate class
size. education costs and emphasis on teaching as an
aspect of graduate development. Therefore, when increased enrollment necessitates additional teachers, the
Assistants, commanding a mere $2,650 per year,9 are
seen as an inexpensive and eager source of manpower.
Their eagerness stems from pr-obable interest in college
teaching careers and the belief that graduate teaching
experience will bolster their chances in a dwindling job
market. On these bases it is not surprising that at ~ome
universities virtually every underclassman has Graduate
Assistant instructors or discussion leaders.
In return for their modest compensation Graduate
Assistants are expected to provide substantial and significant services. Educators differ as to the exact nature
of such services, with some contending Assistants should
not teach but merely aid the university educational
community.'o Ideally this may be desirable, but in
actuality the Assistants often bear the full burden of
instruction. As expressed by educator Harold Taylor in

Students Without Teachers: The Crisis in the University:
"The fact that they (ASSistants) do not yet possess
teaching credentials and higher degrees cannot disguise
the fact that they are already functioning' as teachers
regardless of faculty status . . ." As teachers, the
Assistants have iI quasi-professional interest in the facets
of educational policy which affect their activities. However, as most universities characterize them exclusively
as students, they have no imput into the educational
process.
In addition to teaching, Assistants are typically assigned the less desirable tasks of recording class attendance, grading daily assignments and preparing laboratory experiments. The impact of these onerous assignments on the highly qualified Assistants has been great.
As powerfully described by W. M. Wise:

"I must report that, with a handful of exceptions. the
morale of these Teaching Assistants is low. They believe
they are being exploited by their institutions to meet the
press of expanding undergraduate enrollments. They
report they get linle help from senior faculty members on
the teaching problems they ancounter. They seldom
report that they are treated as young colleagues by
members of the regular faculty; instead, more frequently
they report feeling that they are treated as individual. of
low status em~loyed to do the work that no one else
wants to do:"

Unable to reconcile their considerable talent and teaching responsibilities with menial chores, low pay and lack
of professional legitimacy, Graduate Assistants are increasingly unionizing.

Graduate assistants
are increasingly unionizing"
ff

GRADUATE ASSISTANT BARGAINING
Already Assistants at three major universities are
collectively bargaining through representative associations. In 1971 the Teaching Assistants' Association at
the University of Wisconsin gained recognition as the
exclusive negotiating representative of its Graduate
12
Assistants. In April, 1974 the University of Michigan
Teaching Assistants overwhelmingly selected the
Graduate Employees Organization as the exclusive agent
for that University's 1,600 Teaching Assistants.'3
Teaching Assistant bargaining has also become a reality
at the University of California at Berkley. '4 The fact that
Assistants at these schools have successfully bargained
while others have failed" reflects the misunderstanding
of the Assistants' legal status as "employees' under state
public employment laws. This misunderstanding is also
jeopardizing Intern and Resident bargaining attempts
which increase with their numbers and growing dissetisfaction with hospital management.

INTERN AND RESIDENT DISSATISFACTION
Hospitals offer Internships and Residencies to highly
qualified medical school gra~uates to provide new physicians with clinical experience and the opportunity to
develop specialized expertise. In return for this sponsorship, the Interns and Residents provide the hopitals with
valuable medical services in such areas as emergency
room treatment, surgical assistance and outpetient care.
The extent of these medical services is greet, as Residents and Interns devote 75 to 90 per cent of their
working time to providing patient care,18 with the
remaining period of classroom or seminar training always
subordinate to the medical needs of their patients.
In spite of their excellent academic credentials and the
professional level of medical services they provide,
Interns and Residents characteristically suffer from inadequate pay and poor working conditions. Interns and
Residents average between $10,000 and $14,000 per
year,17 which is modest in light of their hours of work
which often exceed 100 per week.'8 The physical rigors
of these long work days are further compounded by what
Interns and Residents protest are inadequate equipment
and support personnel. Increasingly convinced that their
compensation is not comm4msurate with their training
and responsibilities and that improper scheduling and
inadequate hospital facilities impair effective medical
treatment, Residents and Interns have sought relief in
collective bargaining.
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INTERN AND RESIDENT BARGAINING
To date. several of these bargaining attempts have
been successful. Since 1972 the Committee of Interns
and Residents has bargained for those individuals at New
York City Hospital. 19 In 1973 the Intern and Resident

Association at the University of Michigan Medical Center
was 'recognized as the exclusive representative of that
hospitals' Interns. Residents and Post-Doctoral
Fellows. 20
In May. 1975. the Interns and Residents at Chicago's
Cook County Hospital voted 41 9 to 4 in favor of repre21
sentation by the Cook County Housestaff Association
Finally. during an October. 1975 Conference of the
Physicians National Housestaff Association in Washington. D.C .• representatives of 1 B.OOO 'Residents and
Interns voted overwhelmingly to convert their profes22
sional organization into a bargaining union. In spite of
24

these numerous successes. Intern and Resident unionization continues to draw strong management opposition
for the same .reasons as bargaining by Graduate Assistants: Interns and Residents are regarded as students.
not employees. and therefore cannot collectively bargain.

PUBLIC EMPOYEE LEGISLATION
Whether Interns. Residents and Graduate Assistants
are employees with bargaining rights or students without
recourse depends on their status under state public
employment laws. Examination of public employment
legislation discloses that only two states have specific
provisions prescribing Intern and Assistant bargaining
status. North Carolina has effectively. though undesirably. resolved the controversy through express prohibition
23
of all public employee collective bargaining. At the
opposite end of the spectrum. Iowa in 1974 enacted

legislation specifically establishing Assistants. Interns
and Residents as public employees with bargaining
24
rights. In the remaining 48 states the status of these
individuals is much less settled. To date. 15 states are
without comprehensive public employment laws. 25 although several have enacted legislation recognizing the
bargaining rights of specific groups. Of these 1 5 states.
only Illinois has been confronted with any significant
bargaining attempts. 28 If the bargaining success of the
Cook County Hospital Residents serves as any indication.
then even absent comprehensive legislation bargaining
may be available in Illinois and the remaining 14 states.
In states with comprehensive public employment laws
the status of Assistant. Resident and Intern remains
surprisingly uncertain because of vague or non-existent
"public employee" definitions. As a result of this uncertainty. it is becoming increasingly common for bargaining potential to be settled by ad hoc judicial resolution.
Courts. by careful weighing of student characteristics
against indicia of employment are determining when
Assistants and Interns are employees with bargaining
rights. By general examination of the factors Courts
consider. and of their application to two recent bargaining attempts by Interns in states with comprehensive
public employment lesiglation. the ineffectiveness of
judicial determination becomes evident.

JUDICIAL WEIGHING
Attempts to balance "student-employee" characteristics have been repeatedly undertaken by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Courts to determine
the taxable consequences of stipends paid to Assistants
and Interns. Traditionally. Graduate Assistants seeking
exclusion of stipends from taxable income have argued
that under § 11 7 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code such
payments are "scholarships" designed to meet educational expenses. not payment for services rendered. The
Commissioner. meanwhile. has ruled these payments are
for services performed and in accordance with §117 (b)
and has claimed deficiencies on the untaxed stipends. In
essence. the Assistants contend they are students
receiving study allowances. while the Commissioner
argues a taxable employment relation exists between
Assistant and university. Recent Tax Court cases resolving this controversy have heavily favored the Commissioner's position in spite of Assistants' arguments that
"the primary function of the Graduate Assistantship is to
enable Graduate students to pursue their Graduate
studies,,27 and that their teaching and research duties are
primarily personal learning experiences.
The Assistants' repeated failures to sway the Court are
largely due to the universities' procedure for selecting
Graduate Assistants. This selection usually depends on
the number of unfilled teaching positions rather than the
availability of qualified applicants. Therefore. in appointing an Assistant the university is replacing an
employee it must otherwise hire. On this basis Courts

infer the Assistant provides substantial and valuable
service for which his stipend compensates him. Another
factor mitigating against Assistant success is the ohen
proportional relationship between his stipend and faculty
pay for equivalent teaching. This relation leads the
Courts to infer that the Assistant is being compensated
by his stipend.
There have also been numerous cases involving taxation of Resident and Intern stipends. with the majority of
cases holding stipends taxable since the hospital-student
relationship had all the indicia of an employer-employee
relationship.28 "The almost unanimous conclusion of the
courts has been that the Intern or Resident was furnishing valuable services to the hospital and that payments
received by him were compensatory." 29
In addition to characterizing Interns. Residents and
Assistants as employees by the taxation of their stipends.
Courts have examined additional indicia in resolving the
"student-employee" dichotomy. In Sweet v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board. 322 A. 2d 362 (1974) the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court identified characteristic
traits of an employer-employee relationship: " ... (w)hen
a party has a right to select the employee. the power to
discharge him and the right to direct both the work to be
done and the manner in which such work will be done ..
. " such a relationship exists. As the university and
hospital clearly have such power over the selection.
retention and supervision of Assistants. Interns. and
Residents. a strong case for such an employer-employee
relationship can be made.
The degree of responsibility accorded the Assistant.
Intern and Resident also has bearing on their status as
students or employees. Employers contend that too little
responsibility carries the presumption that teaching and
medical ministering by such persons are primarily learning exercises rather than services for which they are paid.
Courts. however. have adopted more flexible standards
and find that. where Assistants and Interns have more
than minimal responsibility. arguments holding them
"students" for lack of responsibility are largely specious.
Finally. where Assistants. Interns and Resident participate with faculty and hospital staffs in employment
fringe benefits. their case for "employee" status is
strengthened. Such benefits include but are not limited
to: accumulation of annual and sick leave. selective
service reemployment rights. social security withholdings. and coverage by life insurance. hospitalization.
workmen's compensation and pension plans.
Consolidation of these numerous "employee" characteristics lends considerable credence to the argument
that Assistants. Residents and Interns are employees
capable of bargaining under or absent state public
bargaining provisions. Rarely. however. do individuals
possess all of these employment elements. which accounts for the conflicting Court determinations of Intern
and Assistant bargaining status. Examination of two
similar Intern and Resident bargaining attempts in states
with comprehensive public employment legislation illustrate this divergence.
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MICHIGAN INTERNS BARGAIN
In March, 1970 members of the University of Michigan Intern-Resident Association sought recognition by
the University's Regents as bargaining representative for
that school's Interns, Residents and Post-Doctoral Fellows. Following rejection of this request on the basis that
they were "students," The Association petitioned the
Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) for
a certification election. hi March, 1971 MERC acceded
to this request, identifying the University of Michigan as
a public employer and the Interns and Residents public
employees under the Public Employment Relations Act.
(PERA).3o In January, 1972, the Court of Appeals
rejected MERC's holding on the basis that as the PERA
did not define "employee" to include Interns and Re31
sidents, they were presumed to be excluded.
Final resolution of the controversy came in a February,
1973 State Supreme Court hearing of the Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Michigan Employment Relations Commission case, 398 Mich. 98, 204 N.W. 2d
218 (1973). In this decision the Court reversed the Court
of Appeals verdict and found the Association members
were within PERA's "entire public sector of employment" purview. The Michigan Supreme Court based
this determination largely on the employment characteristics of the Association members. Pointing to their
hospitalization benefits, receipt of W-2 employee withholding forms and regular payment schedule, the Court
found that Interns and Residents were employees. In
addition, the Court found a strong argument for employment in the loyalty oath required of Interns and
Residents prior to their appointment. As this oath was
one required by Michigan law of all employees, the Court
felt the Regents, in administering it, considered an
employer-employee relation existed. Finally, the Court
identified the numerous and substantial patient care
services performed by Association members during more
than three-fourths of their working time as indications of
their employment status.
The aftermath of this judicial balancing was that the
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University of Michigan Intern-Resident Association was
determined to be a public employee organization under
Michigan's PERA and became exclusive representative of
more than 650 Interns, Residents and Post-Doctoral
Fellows.
PENNSYLVANIA INTERNS FAIL
In the second case, Wills Eye Hospital v. Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board 15 Pa. 532, 328 A. 2d 539
(1974). Intern and Resident bargaining attempts were
less successful. In November, 1971 the Philadelphia
Association of Interns and Residents (PAIR) petitioned
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) for a
representative election to certify PAIR as the exclusive
bargaining representative of Interns, Residents and
Clinical Fellows at Albert Einstein, Temple University,
and Wills Eye Hospitals. After initially dismissing the
petition in 1972, the PLRB vacated that order and held
an election which PAIR won. The Hospitals appealed this
certification to the Philadelphia County Court of Common
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'Pleas, which in 1973 supported the PLRB ruling.
In upholding the PLRB ruling, the court found that the
individuals concerned enjoyed many incidents of employment, including the devotion of 85-90 per cent of
their time to patient care, and the payment of taxes on
their stipends. Additionally, Interns and Residents shared
in medical, life and malpractice insurance, parking,
cafeteria and laundry privileges, and coverage by workmen's compensation. Finding that the Interns and Residents performed services integral to the hospitals.'
function which could not be terminated without serious
disruption the Court held that they were clearly
employees.
In Decemeber, 1974, against the weight of convincing
PLRB and Common Pleas Court arguments, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in the Wills Eye Hospital
case, ruled Interns and Residents were not public employees, thereby stripping PAIR of its representative
status. In reversing, the Commonwealth Court held
Interns and Residents were "fulfilling educational aspir-

ations in their service at the respective hospitals and that
the status of student is incompatible with the status of
public employee".33
While PAIR, in February, 1975, obtained an appeal to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the chance for reversal
is uncertain at best. Moreover, the fact that the recent
Commonwealth ruling so authoritatively opposes the
Michigan position despite strong case similarities: common employee characteristics of the Interns, comprehensive-yet defined public emplov'T!ent legislation.
and approval of bargaining by both states' labor boards.
indicates continued piecemeal judicial determination is
inadequate.

CONCLUSION
Numerical growth coupled with a militancy borne of
desperation is prompting Graduate Assistant. Intern and
Resident bargaining attempts. Tired of working long
hours under inadequate conditions for grossly. inadequate wages. these student-employees have seized
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Interns. Residents and Clineiel Fellows were studen ... not meeting
the employment criterion of the National Labor Relations Act.
Cedars-Sinai Medical Canter. 21 L.R.R.M. 1341.223 N.L.R.B.•
No. 57 (1976).

upon unionization as a means of achieving greater
professional recognition and economic satisfaction.
Against arguments that as students they are precluded
from bargaining. Interns and Assistants point to their
substantial services. de facto doctor-teecher status and
numerous incidents of employment. Employers. recognizing the zeal if not the merit of their claims. continue to
hold fast to an absolutist management stance.
This alone may not prevent bargaining. however. as
Interns and Assistants. assisted by. liberal court construction of vaguely defined public employment laws and
farsighted provisions like the Iowa Public Employment
Relations Act are realizing the fruition of their bargaining
efforts. If this success is to continue. as indeed it must.
the current approach of piecemeal judicial determination
of bargaining status will not be adequate. The lack of
clear standards and equitable resuhs in the court determinations points to the needs for express statutory
provisions to ensure the Graduate Assistant. Intern and
Resident of much needed relief. Clearly these "students"
are also "employees" in need of legislative guidance to
ensure their bargaining rights.
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Thermal Efficiency Standards
for Buildings
John L. Carver
Recent events indicate that thermal efficiency standards for new building construction will become a reality
in the not-too-distant future. The United States is currently embarking on a campaign for the judicious and
efficient use of our energy resources. The spearhead of
this campaign is the Energy Policy and Conservation

Act.'
Included in this new energy act is a provision which
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urges states to adopt (presumably through the use of the
state "police powers" via building codes) energy conservation plans which include thermal efficiency standards for new building construction. 2 Such standards, if
promulgated, could mandate minimum insulation standards and regulate building design and location in order
to aSSure at least minimal thermal efficiency and resultant energy savings. Practically speaking, this means that

it may no longer be permissible to construct a building
which is esthetically pleasing to the builder but energy
inefficient. In addition, even if the design is satisfactory,
the builder may well discover that building costs are
drastically increased. Insulation, as well as other construction materials and requirements necessary to build
the desired structure in a thermally efficient manner,
could cause such increases. Failure to meet the thermal
efficiency standards in the applicable building code could
result in either the denial of a building permit for construction, or the imposition of fines, or the demolition of
a structure. All of this could mean that a home at the
price and of the design an average American can afford
may become increasingly difficult for many Americans to
acquire.

Thermal efficiency standards are principally related to
a desire to make wise and efficient use of energy resources. Though this desire is laudable, it is not so
necessary to protect the public health or safety as to
withstand a strict construction of constitutional standards. The case law reveals, however, that there is a
substantial precedent. through the liberal definition of
the term "welfare," for establishing thermal efficiency
standards.
ENFORCEMENT
In a 1949 case, the Washington Supreme Court said
that.
The state. in the exercise of its (POlice) power to enact
laws for the general welfare of its people. may enact laws
designed to increase the industries 01 the state. . . and
5
add to its wealth.

Practically speaking, this
means that it may no longer be
permissible to construct a
bUIlding which is aesthetically
pleasing to the bUIlder but
energy inefficient

As the court in this case indicates, it is proper for a
state to exercise its "police powers" in order to promote
the economic and social advancement of a state. e The
stated purposes of the new Energy Policy and Conservation Act are as follows:
Sac. 361. (a) The Congrass finds that(1) the developmant and implementation by States 01
laws. policies. programs. and proceduras 10 conserva and
to improve efficiency in the use 01 anergy will have an
immediate and substantial effect in raducing the rate 01
growth 01 energy demand and in minimizing the adverse
social. economic. political. and environmental impacts of
increasing energy consumption;
(2) the development and implementation 01 energy
conservation programs by States will most efficiently and
effectively minimize any adverse economic or em·
ploymant impacts 01 changing patterns of energy use and
meet local economic. climatic. geographic. and other
unique condjtions and requirements of each State; and

The new Energy Policy and Conservation Act places
the burden of establishing and monitoring such thermal
efficiency standards on the individual states. This is a
proper state role in that thermal efficiency standards can
best be classified as a "police power" exercise. The best
and perhaps only Virginia authority for establishing and
enforcing thermal efficiency standards is the Virginia
State Board of Housing, which under Va. Code Ann. 36
§97 et. seq. was given authority for the establishment of
a uniform statewide building code. Persuant to this
legislative mandate, the Virginia State Board of Housing,
on January 29, 1973, adopted by reference the Building
Officials and Code Administrators, International, Inc.
code (hereinafter B.O.C.A.).3 The B.O.C.A. code, like
most other codes known to this writer, does not in any of
its sections make provision for or reference to insulation
standards or general thermal efficiency requirements.
The absence of such a provision is probably due to
traditional theory and precedents for the exercise of the
police powers, through which the building code was
developed to insure building construction which was
4
consistent with public safety and health.

(3) the Federal Government h.s a responsibility to
foster and promote comprehensive energy CO"88N8tion
programs and practices by establishing guidelines for
such programs and providing overall coordination. technicel assistance. and linancial .u~port lor specific State
initiatives in energy conservation.

Clearly the objectives enumerated in this act fall within
the sco~e of the "police power" as discussed in State v.
Dexter:.
Conservation of natural resources has long been
recognized as a legitimate police power function. In
1957 an Ohio court of appeals stated that "the conservation of natural resources is within the so-called 'police
power' of the state. ,,9 The Ohio court's opinion clearly
follows the dictate of the U.S. Supreme Court in City of
Trenton v. New Jersey in which the court held that it is
the duty of a state to conserve naturel resources. 'O In
1970 the Mississippi Supreme Court clearly adopted this
viewpoint when it held that
There can no longer be any doubt as to the power of
the state to regulate and promote the utilization 01 natural
resources subject only to the requirements that such
regulations be reasonable and not in contravention 01 the
Constitutional provisions. 11
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A long line of cases hold that states may exercise the
police powers to prevent the waste of their resources. 12
Possibly this line of cases should be distinguished from
. the issue presently under consideration. The thermal
efficiency standard for buildings imposed through the
use of state "police power" related to the use of energy
resources regardless of the source of their origin of
extraction. The Rne of cases cited. however. if narrowly
construed deals only with resources actually extracted
within the jurisdiction of the state deciding the case.
Hence. it is possible to distinguish this line of cases from
thermal efficiency regulation which seeks to regulate the
use of resources regardless of the point of extraction.
A more general analysis of the scope of the "police
powers." without regard specifically to the regulation of
resources. will reveal .that the establishment of thermal
efficiency standards is within the currently recognized
scope of the "police powers". In 1 959. the Oklahoma
Supreme Court stated that
The lerm "police power" comprehend. the power to
make and enforce all wholesome and reasonable laws
and regulations necessary to the mainleinence. upbuilding. and advancement of the public _al and the pr0tection of the public inlerest. It is plastic in its nature. and
will expand to meet the ectual requirements 01 an advancing civilization and adapt itseH to the necessities of
moral, senilery, economic and political condition.. No
principle in our system 01 govemment will limit the right
01 govamment to respond to public need and protect the
public _Hare. ,3

The limit of a state's exercise of the "police powers" is
reached when a regulation transcends public necessity.'·
To determine if thermal efficiency standards promulgated for the achievement of energy conservation transcend
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public necessity, the courts will have to determine if the
enactment in question has for its goal the prevention of
some offense or manifest evil which could undermine the
preservation of the public health, safety, morals, or
16
general welfare. It is also important to note that the
term "general welfare" includes the power of a state to
"enact laws designed to increase the industries of the
state ... and add to its welfare."'·
As can be seen. terms such as "transcends public
necessity" and "general welfare" are flexible and have
evolved over time to remain responsive to the real or
perceived needs of an advancing society. As the federel
Energy Policy Conservation Act indicated, our society
perceives that there is a need to conserve energy in order
to assure the future industry and economic wellbeing of
the nation. This legislative determination of the nation's
needs will not be lightly disregarded by the Judiciary.
The Supreme Court's attitude toward regulations which
reflect the needs of society is evident in the following
statement. "Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary
restraint. not immunity from reasonable regulations and
prohibitions imposed in the interests of the
community.,,17
This is the test of reasonableness the courts will apply
to the proposed thermal efficiency standards for buildings, since there seams to be nothing arbitrary about
such regulations. They are in the interest of the public
and do not transcend the public necessity, as the necessity is apparent. The inescapable conclusion is. therefore.
that there will be little or no legal difficulty in establishing
thermal efficiency standards for buildings as an exercise
of the state "police powers" through the use of building
codes.

THE MEANS AND THE ENDS
As a general principle, probably everyone favors wise
and efficient energy use. In the abstract, few would
dispute the advantage of proper construction and insulation procedures to assure at least minir:nal levels of
thermal efficiency. However, a practical public analysis
of the specific legal means necessary to ensure this
efficiency, with extrapolation as to the ultimate results,
would undoubtedly cause some degree of public
consternation.
As has been discussed, there is sufficient legal
precedent for the use of building codes to promulgate
thermal efficiency standards; but the price for the use of
such building code standards may be increased construction costs and resultant reduced availability of
affordable housing for low income groups. This apparent
disadvantage is mitigated by the fact that those who find
it possible to purchase housing, even at increased cost,
will be able to heat and cool such structures because of
their thermally efficient construction. In the long term,
such thermal maintenance cost sevings will probably
exceed initial construction cost increases.
There is, however, another more important, if less
obvious, "price" for the use of building codes for
achieving thermal efficiency. As with every new or
expanded exercise of the "police powers," there is a
direct loss of individual freedom of action. A very strict
thermal efficiency standard, enforced through building
codes, could mandate that architectural design be

regulated. In addition to insulation standards, an architectural design containing large amounts of glass or
cathedral ceilings may be suspect. To receive approval
for such an architectural design, compromises may
become necessary. The owner (builder) may be forced to
use only insulated glass with a type of thermal or insulated curtain inside which will reduce heat loss in cold
periods, or heat buildup in hot periods. The maintenance
of special glass and curtains would have to be monitored,
on a continuing basis. through the use of housing codes.
One can hypothesize a situation where a building permit
wOuld be denied until design revision was made removing all large windows from the north side of a building.
An extreme situation could arise where a building permit
would be denied for construction of a thermally inefficient building in a location subject to harsh thermal
conditions, such as a windswept mountaintop. Certainly
a structure could be constructed which would, despite
the harsh conditions of the location, be thermally efficient. But what would such a structure look like?
Perhaps it would be a squatty, windowless structure
half-buried in the ground! No doubt such extreme results
are unlikely, but they do point out some of the potential
problems with using building codes in order to achieve
thermally efficient buildings.
An alternative to the building code approach is found
in the well-established system of tax incentives and
"penalties". It is beyond the scope of this article to
elaborate on the precise manner in which this could be
accomplished. The major argument against such a system is that the rich could still make inefficient use of
energy if they paid the penalty, and that tax methods
place the burden of energy conservation on the poor.
But. as has been previously indicated, the less affluent
would be benefitted economically by achieving thermal
efficiency. First. they would receive significant tax savings through compliance. Second. there would be significant financial savings through reduced fuel costs
based on reduced consumption effectuated by the construction of a thermally efficient structure.
There is another advantage of the tax method as
compared to the "police power" building code method.
The tax method can be used to retrofit existing inefficient
structures through tax incentives. The code method
would be severely restricted in regard to existing structures; political. legal, and constitutional problems would
undoubtedly make retrofit infeasible. The building code
method would have to grant a "non-conforming use" to
existing inefficient structures and be limited to acting
only upon future construction (as does the new energy
act cited herein).
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the tax incentive
method is the possibility of large scale retrofit of existing
thermally inefficient structures. Tllis benefit is important
because existing housing has a relatively long life expectancy; hence it will not be rapidly replaced by new,
efficient structures. Under the building code system,
without retrofit potential. it could be 50 to 100 years
before a majority of presently existing housing could be
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replaced by thermally efficient new construction. Under
a tax incentive system, a large percentage of all structures could be made energy efficient within the near
future. The percentage of buildings which could be made
thermally efficient, and the time frame in which this
could be accomplished, would be functions of the benefit
derived by the tax incentive and corresponding tax
detriment imposed for failing to retrofit.
The future will hold thermal efficiency standards for
new buildings, for the promotion of thermal efficiency to
save fuel is desirable. The use of the building code to
implement thermal efficiency goals is the method most
likely to be employed. However, the building code
method has the potential for very real problems, the
restriction of individual freedom and the lack of retrofit
potential being perhaps the most serious. The tax incentive method is less complex, more equitable, economically feasible, ,and consistent with maximizing fuel
savings in the shortest possible period of time. The
United States needs to save energy today. To wait 50
years for the presently existing thermally inefficient
structures to be replaced by new efficient construction
may be to wait too long. By then the resultant energy
savings that are the benefit of thermally efficient buildings may have arrived too late to effectively conserve our
fuel resources.
5. National Electric Code I 1971 and excerpts for Ona-and·
Two Family Dwellings.
.
6. 1974 Accumulative Supplement to Virginia Uniform
Stat_ide Building Code.
The Uniform Statewide Building Code of Virginia became
effective on September 1, 1973. By Sapt, 1, 1975, all Virginia
localities were using the Code. Va. Code Ann. 36 §97, et. seq.
repeals Va. Code Ann. 27 §5, 1 which permitted localities to adopt
their own individual building codes.

FOOTNOTES
1. Energy. Policy and Conservation Act U.S.C. §6201, et. seq.
(1975).
2, Id. §6322. Sec. 362. (a) The administrator shall, by rule, within
80 days after the date of enactment of this Act, prescribe

guidelines for the preparation of a State energy conservation
feasibility report. The Administrator shall invite the Governor of
each State to submit, within 3 months after the effective date of
such guidelines, such a report. Such report shall include(1) an assessment of the feasibility of establishing a Slate
enargy conservation goal. which goal shall consist of a reduction,
as a result of tha implementation of the State energy ci>ilservation
plan described in this section, of 5 percent or more in the total
amount of energy consumad in such State in the year 1980 for
the projected energy consumption for such State in the year
1980, and
(2) a proposal by such Stata for the development of a State
energy conservation plan to achieve such goal.
(b) The administrator' shall, by rule, within 6 months after the
date of enectment of this Act, prescribe guidelines with respect to
measures required to be includad in, and guidelines for the
development. modification and funding of, State energy conser·
vation plans. The administrator shall invite the Govemor of eec:h
State to submit, within 5 months aftar the effective date of such
guidelines, a report. Such report shall include(1) a proposed State energy conservation plan designed to
result in schedulad progress toward, and achievement of, the
State energy conservation goal of such State; and
(2) a detai!ad description of the requirements, including the
estimated cost of implementation and the estimated energy
savings, associatad with each functional category of energy
conservation incfuded in the State energy conservation plan,
(c) Each proposed State energy conservation plan to be eligible
for Faderal 8IIistance under this pert shall include(4) mandatory thermal efficiency standards and insulation
requirements for n_ and renovatad buildings (except buildings
owned or leased by tha Unitad States); and .
3. The Uniform Statewide 8uilding Code of Virginia consists of the
following:
1. The B.O.C.A. Basic Building Code I 1970 with Accumula·
tive Supplement 1972.
2. B.O.C.A. Basic Mechanical Codel 1971.
3. B.O.C.A. Basic Plumbing Code I 1970 with Accumulative
Supplement 1972.
4. Ona and Two Family Dwelling Code, 1971 adition

32

4. Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet. law and
order.-these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional application of the police power. Vet they merely
illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it. Application
of Kay. 341 P. 2d 284, 286 (Okla .. 1959).
5. State v. Dexter, 202 P. 2d 906 (Wash .. 1949),
6.

The "police power" of the states is a power which the states have
not surrendered to the nation, and which by the Tenth Amendment. was expressly reservad to states, respectively; or to the
people. Jordan v, Gaines, 131 Me, 291, 8 A.2d 585, 587
(1939).

7. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §6321 (1975).
8. 202 P.2d 906 (Wash., 1949).
9. Statev. Martin. 152 N.E. 2d 898. 901·92 (Ohio Ct. App .. 1957).
10. 262 U.S. 182 (1922).
11. Masonite Corp. v, State Oil and Gas Board. 240 So, 2d 448
(Miss,. 1970).
12. Leiter Minerals v. california Compeny. 241 la. 915. 132 So. 2d
845.851 (1981); Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Choctaw Gas Co .•
238 P, 2d 970. 975 (Okla .• 1951).
13

Application of Kay. 341 P.2d 284. 286 (Okla .. 1959).

14. People's Petroleum Producers v. Sterling. 60 F.2d 1041 (E.O.
Tex .• 1932).
15, Barman v. Packer. 348 U.S, 26 (1954).
16. State v. Dexter. 202 P.2d 906 (Wash .. 1949).
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